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THE GOOD SOCIETY, COMMERCE,
AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
Michael C. Dorf'
INTRODUCTION
What is the relation between constitutional interpretation and the
good society? Different approaches to constitutional interpretation
give very different answers.
For textualists and originalists,' there is no necessary connection.
For them, the goal of constitutional interpretation is to discover what
the words of the Constitution mean or meant and enforce that
meaning. The constitutional textualist or originalist may believe, like
many lay Americans have believed for much of our history, that the
"Miracle at Philadelphia," as supplemented by the amendment
process, has produced such a wondrous document that applying its
meaning will typically lead to the best of all possible worlds.2 The
textualist or originalist, however, accepts that when the Constitution
and his vision of the good society make competing demands, he owes
his allegiance to the former.
Interpreters committed to a "moral reading" of the Constitution
believe that at least some provisions of the Constitution-most
notably the First Amendment, the Due Process Clauses, and the
Equal Protection Clause-enact moral principles For two reasons,
those moral principles are not co-extensive with the ordering
principles of the good society. First, the Constitution only provides a
framework of government; it does not set forth a comprehensive
moral view. Thus, a complete vision of the good society must
supplement the Constitution's moral principles with additional ones.
Second, at least as espoused by its leading proponent, the moral
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. For extraordinarily useful
comments and conversations, I am grateful to Vince Blasi, Sherry Colb, Jamie
Colburn, Barry Friedman, Dirk Hartog, Sam Issacharoff, Chuck Sabel. and Phil
Weiser. Scott Chesin provided outstanding research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 23-25, 138-40 (1997);
Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... And Constitutions, 85 Geo. Li. 1823, 1833-36
(1997).
2. For a discussion of popular attitudes toward the Constitution, see Michael
Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself (1986).
3. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution 7-15 (1996).
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reading recognizes the constraint of precedent broadly construed.' A
moral reading must not only be morally attractive; it must also fit our
constitutional tradition, and that tradition may depart in important
respects from the ideal. Within these limits, however, a moral reading
of the Constitution is likely to advance the reader's vision of the good
society.
Process theorists of constitutional interpretation begin with the
assumption that our system of government assigns to elected
representatives the task of resolving most disputes about what the
good society is and how to foster it. Process theorists interpret the
Constitution as authorizing judges to unblock the democratic process,
thereby directly facilitating democratic deliberation, but only
indirectly fostering the good society.5
The list of constitutional theories and their relation to the good
society could be expanded and refined, but, for my purposes, the
foregoing sufficiently illustrates the diverse possibilities. By accepting
the offer to present one of the principal papers for this panel, I appear
to have taken upon myself the burden of setting out my own approach
to constitutional interpretation, articulating its relation to and vision
of the good society, and then urging that my theory, rather than one of
its rivals, be adopted. I am unable to discharge that burden, however,
because I do not believe that judges or other constitutional
interpreters "choose a constitutional theory like a suit off the rack."'6
My view of constitutional interpretation is pragmatic, but not in the
same way as that term has been used in the recent debate between
Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin. I consider myself a
pragmatist in the sense that philosophers use that term-namely, the
view that one understands institutions and practices by participating
in them according to their own (corrigible) rules, rather than by
pondering them from the outside. [Dworkin] offers an argument
against a different sort of pragmatism-the view that [as Richard
Fallon disparagingly characterizes it] "judges should simply decide
cases in whatever way will produce the best future results." There is
no necessary connection between this notion of legal pragmatism
and philosophical pragmatism. The former is a form of
instrumentalism, the latter a form of contextualism. One can find
[the] arguments against pure adjudicatory instrumentalism
persuasive, but still believe that the best way to make sense of
constitutional practice is to participate in it, rather than theorize
about it.7
4. See id. at 10-11 (discussing integrity).
5. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 105-07 (1980).
6. Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 593,
595 (1999).
7. Id. at 595-96 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 535, 564 (1999)).
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Thus, to understand the relation between constitutional interpretation
and the good society, I believe it is most useful to look at how cases
are decided.
At the level of doctrine, much of constitutional interpretation
concerns itself with questions of regulatory immunity. Various
spheres of activity are protected against the political process to
different degrees. Sorting permissible from impermissible
interventions is not, at the level of official doctrine, specifically about
visions of the good society. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices routinely
disclaim any connection between their constitutional judgments and a
vision of the good society.' Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the
boundaries of regulatory immunity will in substantial measure reflect
the Justices' vision of the good society. Crudely, activities the Court
values highly will, other things being equal, receive greater immunity
than activities the Court values less.
This article explores the doctrinal relation between regulatory
immunity and conceptions of the good society through two recent
Supreme Court decisions. In United States v. Morrison, the Court
held that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to create a
right of action against private actors for gender-motivated violence
because such violence is not, in any obvious sense, "economic"
activity.1" In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale," the Court ruled that the
application to the Boy Scouts of a state public accommodations law
forbidding sexual orientation discrimination violated the
organization's freedom of expressive association, 2 relying in part (I
shall argue) on the fact that the Boy Scouts are a non-commercial
association.
Although these two cases concern quite different doctrines, they
both make regulability-whether by the federal government or at
all-turn in part on participation in commercial or economic activity.
(I shall use the terms commercial and economic inter-changeably.)
Non-commercial activities are more likely to enjoy immunity from
federal regulation than are commercial activities, and non-commercial
associations are more likely to enjoy immunity from federal, state and
local public accommodations laws than their commercial counterparts.
8. See, eg., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2479 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The fact that we are cognizant of this laudable decline in stereotypical
thinking on homosexuality should not, however, be taken to control the resolution of
this case."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Some of us as
individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that
cannot control our decision."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not
like.").
9. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
10. Id. at 1751.
11. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
12 Id- at 2457.
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Ceteris paribus, there is greater freedom to engage in non-commercial
than otherwise similar commercial activities. Yet that result seems at
least a little bit ironic coming from a conservative Court that has
reinvigorated property rights through the Takings Clause.13 What
accounts for the fact that the Rehnquist Court seems to privilege non-
commercial over commercial activity by partially immunizing the
former from regulation? 4
This article suggests that the Court's constitutional attitude toward
commercial activity in these and some other cases rests on a seductive
but mistaken interpretation of the overruling of Lochner v. New
York. 5 From Holmes' famous contention that "a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory," 6 it follows that
laws should not be invalidated simply because they depart from
laissez-faire assumptions. Yet the Court has sometimes inferred
more, as in Boy Scouts and Morrison, where it treats the purported
absence of economic activity as an impediment to regulation, and in
other cases discussed below, where it treats the presence of economic
activity as a sufficient basis to overcome claims of regulatory
immunity. Neither inference is warranted. The overruling of Lochner
tells us that a claim of economic liberty is not a sufficient basis for
regulatory immunity. It does not imply that the commercial or non-
commercial nature of any activity in general ought to be the
dispositive factor in constitutional interpretation.
How does the distinction between commercial and non-commercial
activity affect the Court's vision of the good society? My hypothesis is
that current doctrine partially reflects a distorting cognitive division of
the fields of human endeavor into a domain of private, non-market
activity and a domain of public, economic activity. The latter is seen
as largely instrumental to the former: we work, earn, and buy to
sustain ourselves for the activities that really matter -such as religious
devotion, family, and friendship. Government regulation of public,
economic activity is presumptively permissible both because that
activity is public-connected to the well-being of others-and because
it is economic, i.e., instrumental, and thus less constitutive of the self
than private, non-economic activity.
Why has a conservative Court that values free enterprise sometimes
fallen prey to this distorting cognitive map? Taking a legal realist
perspective we might conclude that the Rehnquist Court uses the
13. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-31 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
831-32 (1987).
14. I do not rule out the possibility that nothing explains the pattern of decisions
across divergent doctrines, but before reaching that conclusion, it is worth exploring
other possibilities.
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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distinction purely instrumentally-i.e., simply as a handy tool to
justify results it reaches on other, ideological, grounds. Nonetheless,
the question remains why the Court finds this particular distinction to
be an effective tool. By connecting the sometimes-invoked distinction
between economic and non-economic activity to a larger
constitutional and ultimately social vision, I hope to explain why the
Court finds attractive a distinction that is problematic for the very
Justices who espouse it.
Part I argues that the overall shape of constitutional rights doctrine
in the modem era encourages the Court to attach exaggerated
significance to the distinction between economic and non-economic
activity. Since 1937, constitutional doctrine has quite properly
accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality to "economic"
legislation, but this has sometimes led the Justices and other
constitutionalists to attribute to the presence or absence of economic
factors greater weight than appropriate. Part I uses Boy Scouts and
other rights cases as illustrations.
Part II argues that the same phenomenon may be at work in the
recent cases narrowly construing the Commerce Clause. Although
one might think that the Clause's express invocation of "commerce"
explains the recent decisions attaching cardinal significance to the
commercial or non-commercial character of regulated activity, I show
how more than fidelity to text is required to support these decisions.
Part III offers a longer-term perspective on the vision of the good
society associated with the economic/non-economic distinction. This
part asks whether anything other than a confused understanding of
the meaning of the overruling of Lochner lies behind the Court's
vision. I tentatively propose a neo-Jeffersonian account-one that
ties together the virtues of limited central government and a polity
comprising yeoman farmers-as a possible justification for this vision.
However, I ultimately reject this account as untrue to Jefferson and
unworkable in modem times.
I conclude that the Court often employs the economic/non-
economic distinction as a substitute for a public/private distinction.
Yet the fit is quite poor. As de Tocqueville knew, "private"
associations are very much enmeshed in, and supported by,
commercial activity. Moreover, these same private associations serve
fundamentally public functions. There may be constitutionally sound,
indeed pressing, reasons to confer some form of regulatory immunity
on various activities or associations because they are local or private.
But in our inter-connected world those reasons will rarely be justified
by the objective characteristics of the activities or associations. Seen
this way, the attempt to separate the economic from the non-
economic is a flight from the sorts of value judgments necessary to
construct a viable domain of regulatory immunity.
2165
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I. THE POST-1937 LEGACY
A first principle of post-1937 judicial review holds that "economic
and social legislation" is presumptively valid. 7 However, even as the
Justices continue to invoke this axiom, 8 there is considerable
confusion about precisely what is meant by economic and social
legislation. Laws mandating segregated schools or forbidding
contraceptive use quite obviously address social relations; yet, they
would hardly be presumed valid. The formal doctrinal solution is
straightforward: economic and social legislation is only presumed
valid absent the employment of a suspect classification or the
infringement of a fundamental right. But this formulation provides no
help in identifying what constitutes a suspect classification or, even
more problematically, a fundamental right.
The Court's response to this difficulty takes a characteristic form.
Because most laws calling for heightened scrutiny have been
susceptible of characterization as social legislation, the Justices have
tended to treat the residual unprotected category as simply economic
legislation. The distinction dates at least as far back as the
controversy over President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. 9 Even as
critics denounced judicial overreaching in economic matters, they
sought to preserve the Court's counter-majoritarian function with
respect to (other) civil rights."0 The Court itself followed suit. Justice
Douglas' dissent in Poe v. Ullman, ' perhaps the font of modern
unenumerated rights doctrine, is typical. He wrote:
The error of the old Court, as I see it, was not in entertaining
inquiries concerning the constitutionality of social legislation but in
applying the standards that it did. Social legislation dealing with
business and economic matters touches no particularized prohibition
of the Constitution, unless it be the provision of the Fifth
Amendment that private property should not be taken for public use
without just compensation. If it is free of the latter guarantee, it has
a wide scope for application. 22
It is easy to understand why, taking Lochner and its ilk as an anti-
paradigm, Justice Douglas and others would treat the regulation of
run-of-the-mill economic activity as falling within the presumption of
constitutionality. Even if the legislative classifications in such classic
17. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,316 (1993); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666,701 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971, 1040-44 (2000).
20. See id. at 1040-43.
21. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
22. Id. at 517-18 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
2166 [Vol. 69
2001] COMMERCE AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
post-1937 cases as Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.'-advantaging
optometrists and ophthalmologists at the expense of opticians 4 -or
Ferguson v. Skrupa2-advantaging lawyers against other debt
adjusters 6-seem arbitrary or worse,2  some arbitrariness is
understood as an acceptable price to pay to avoid judicial
overreaching of the Lochner sort. Yet, as I shall shortly illustrate, the
Court has sometimes gone further, treating the economic or
commercial character of regulated activity as a reason to strip that
activity of protection it might otherwise enjoy.
These further steps hardly follow from the overruling of Lochner,
however, because activities with a substantial commercial component
may be deserving of constitutional protection nonetheless. To give
just a few examples: marriage is in substantial measure an economic
relationship; religious institutions engage in a wide variety of not-for-
profit, but nonetheless clearly economic activities, such as building
houses of worship, running schools, and raising money for such
activities; doctors performing abortions are typically compensated for
doing so; and news organizations peddle their wares not only in the
marketplace of ideas but in the actual marketplace as well.
Although the mixed commercial character of the regulated activity
in the foregoing examples has not blinded the Court to the
appropriateness of constitutional protection, in other areas the Court
has sometimes fallen prey to the tendency to think that
commercialization entails lack of protection. A recent example of this
phenomenon is Minnesota v. Carter.' In that case, the two
respondents claimed that a police officer violated their Fourth
Amendment rights when he peered through a closed blind of a third
person's apartment and observed the three of them bagging cocaine.2,
The Court held that the respondents lacked the requisite "expectation
of privacy" to raise a Fourth Amendment objection because they
"were obviously not overnight guests, but were essentially present for
a business transaction and were only in the home a matter of
hours .... While the apartment was a dwelling place for [the lessee], it
was for these respondents simply a place to do business. '""
It is not entirely clear that the Carter Court would have reached a
different result had the respondents been doing something other than
business; the terse opinion lists two additional factors that contribute
23. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
24. Id. at 488-89.
25. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
26. Id. at 732.
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L
Rev. 1689, 1712-14 (1984).
28. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
29. Id. at 85.
30. Id. at 90.
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to its decision.31 However, the business purpose is the factor that
receives the most emphasis. Is that sensible? If, instead of bagging
cocaine, the respondents were snorting it, would they then have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy? Why should any of this matter
given that the police could not know, ex ante, the nature of the
activity inside the apartment? The Court's Fourth Amendment
doctrine sometimes sensibly accords noticeably commercial activity
less protection than other forms of activity; 32 equally sensibly, the
doctrine does not invariably strip workplace activity of all Fourth
Amendment protection by virtue of its commercial situs.33 In Carter,
however, the Court accords the commercial character of the activity in
question unwarranted significance. Looking for a justification to deny
what the Justices no doubt regarded as a constitutional windfall to
drug traffickers, they appear to have mistakenly concluded that,
notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment, this was a case of mere
"business and economic matters touch[ing] no particularized
prohibition of the Constitution."'
The Boy Scouts case is a particularly interesting example of the
connection the Court draws between commercial activity and
regulability. In two pre-Boy Scouts cases, the Court rejected claims of
associational rights to resist anti-discrimination statutes where the
associations in question-the Rotary and the Jaycees, respectively-
provided their members with opportunities to make business
contacts.35 In a third pre-Boy Scouts case, the Court rejected a facial
challenge to an anti-discrimination ordinance that was justified on the
same basis.36 Giving expression to an acute form of the distinction we
have been considering, Justice O'Connor wrote in a separate
concurrence in one of those cases: "[a]n association must choose its
market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any
substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership
that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the
marketplace of ideas."37
31. See id. at 91 ("The purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in
here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous
connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to conclude that
respondents' situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises [than
to that of an overnight guest].").
32. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) ("An expectation of privacy
in commercial premises.., is different from, and indeed less than, a similar
expectation in an individual's home.").
33. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715-16 (1987) (recognizing workers'
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal belongings).
34. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984).
36. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988).
37. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 20 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Predominately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a
2168 [Vol. 69
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The Boy Scouts Court might have placed dispositive importance on
the fact that the Boy Scouts-like the parade organizers in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,31
but unlike the Jaycees or the Rotary-had avoided sullying their
hands with commerce.39 To its credit, the Boy Scouts Court did not
rely exclusively on the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial activities. Nonetheless, the distinction played a
distressingly substantial role in the decision. In setting forth the
history of anti-discrimination laws, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
opinion for the Court, noted that the conflict between anti-
discrimination law and associational rights was occasioned by the
expansion of the statutory "definitions of 'public accommodation' ...
from clearly commercial entities, such as restaurants, bars, and hotels,
to membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts."' Note the
dichotomy: an entity is either commercial or a membership
organization. In this regard, Boy Scouts is of a piece with Justice
O'Connor's earlier claim that an association ceases to be protected as
such by engaging in commercial activity. Here, because the Boy
Scouts had not engaged in commercial activity, they retained their
associational rights.41
The Boy Scouts case also contains a classic statement of the post-
1937 understanding of the primary role of economic activity in
constitutional law. Quoting Justice Brandeis, Justice Stevens in his
Boy Scouts dissent criticized the Court for interfering with New
First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the anti-
discrimination provisions triggered by the law."). Another expressive association
case, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), also drew a
sharp distinction between commercial and non-commercial entities. See id. at 256-63.
There the Court argued that the compelling interest that justifies forbidding
corporations from using general treasury funds for political activities-an interest in
preventing a company's fortunes in the market from exerting an excessive influence in
the unrelated marketplace of ideas-does not justify applying the same fund
segregation requirement to an association that raises all of its funds from private
contributions by people who support its expressive aims. See id. That distinction,
however, may be sensible; at least it is substantially different from a general
inclination to afford less autonomy to organizations engaged in commercial activities.
38. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
39. See iL at 579.
40. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2456 (2000).
41. Justice O'Connor appeared to take this position during the oral argument.
She asked Dale's lawyer:
Do you think there's a difference at all in application of such a policy to
commercial entities and groups, as opposed to private membership groups?
Does that weigh in the balance at all? I mean, I can well understand how a
public accommodation law should apply to commercial groups, or even to
groups such as Jaycees, which essentially depend on a commercial nexus for
its membership. Should it apply, do you think, or should the weight we give
it in the context of a First Amendment claim be the same for a purely private
organization?
Boy Scouts, No. 99-699, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 44, at *28-29 (Apr. 26, 2000).
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Jersey's ability to experiment with "things social."42 In response, the
majority upbraided Justice Stevens for using this archaic formulation.
The Boy Scouts majority, true to the modern view, characterized
Brandeis as "a champion of state experimentation in the economic
realm."43 "But," the Court continued, "Justice Brandeis was never a
champion of state experimentation in the suppression of free
speech."'  In other words, "things social" includes too much
constitutionally privileged activity to count as a fair description of the
zone of legitimate regulatory experimentation.
To be sure, the Court does not always equate the non-commercial
character of activity with non-regulability, nor, as I acknowledged in
the Fourth Amendment discussion above, does it always withdraw
constitutional protection because of the presence of commercial
features. 45  Moreover, in some doctrinal areas, such as freedom of
speech, the doctrine appears to be moving toward taking commercial
features into account with some attention to nuance.46 These are
healthy trends, and viewed within this larger context, the fixation on
commercial activity in recent cases like Carter and (to a lesser degree)
Boy Scouts might be taken as aberrational, but I fear that they are not.
An increasingly formalist Court is looking for bright lines, and the
commercial/non-commercial distinction fits so well with the post-1937
era zeitgeist as to exert a powerful gravitational pull.
Indeed, the impulse to denigrate activities with a commercial
character is so ingrained that it has become a common move among
constitutional litigators. Consider Bowers v. Hardwick.47 Challenging
the application of Georgia's sodomy prohibition to a gay couple,
Hardwick's extremely accomplished lawyers-Laurence H. Tribe,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, and Brian Koukoutchos-felt obliged to supply
a limiting principle to distinguish forms of sexuality to which the
42. Boy Scouts, 120 S. Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The full
quotation from Justice Brandeis, also cited by Justice Stevens, see Boy Scouts, 120 S.
Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting), refers to "experimentation in things social and
economic." New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. Boy Scouts, 120 S. Ct. at 2457.
44. Id.
45. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 787-95
(1988) (invalidating a law regulating fundraising fees and requiring that paid
fundraisers be licensed and that they disclose to potential donors the percentage of
funds that go to pay fundraisers). One can take issue with the Riley Court's
conclusion that the disclosure provision is not narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest. See id. at 798-801. I cite the case because the Court does not
allow the presence of some commercial features to relegate the speech to a lesser
status. See id. at 796 ("Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a
compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect
of the compelled statement thereon.").
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Justices would be unwilling to afford constitutional protection.'
Thus, they characterized prostitution as a mere "commercial
exchange[]. ' '49 Then, sensing that the Justices would also fear that a
victory for Hardwick might entail a right to same-sex marriage, the
brief authors sought to allay these fears by characterizing marriage in
commercial terms: "Marriage," they contended, "unlike other
manifestations of intimate association, is a contract controlled by the
state, and, like 'any other institution,' it is 'subject to the control of the
legislature."'50
This last move was an uncharacteristic blunder. Although modem
substantive due process doctrine allows reasonable regulation of the
incidents of marriage,51 restrictions or prohibitions on the core right to
marry are subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.51 But my point is not to
criticize Hardwick's lawyers. Rather, I wish to illustrate the
seductiveness of the economic/non-economic distinction in the post-
1937 constitutional order. The next part argues that this same
seduction may be at work in the recent Commerce Clause decisions.
II. ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
I begin with a necessary concession: the principal significance of
United States v. Lopez53 and United States v. Morrison' -respectively
invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act and portions of the
Violence Against Women Act as beyond the scope of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce 5 -concerns federalism. In
most respects, these cases are part of the Rehnquist Court's larger
project of restricting federal power in favor of the States. To be sure,
Lopez and Morrison restrict the ends Congress may pursue, while
most of the other federalism doctrines place limits on the means by
which Congress may act: Congress cannot "commandeer" state
legislative or executive officials;56 Congress cannot authorize suits
48. Brief for Respondent at text accompanying notes 34-38, Bowers (No. 85-140).
49. Id.
50. Id. at text accompanying note 44 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205
(1888)).
51. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (-[W]e do not mean to
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary,
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.").
52. See id. at 384-87; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
54. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
55. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
56. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-69 (1992).
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against the States for retrospective relief; 7 and Congress cannot take
a variety of measures absent an exceptionally clear statement.5 8
Nonetheless, the overall philosophy of the cases is clearly the same:
they reflect suspicion of federal power and a heroic view of the States
that borders on Anti-Federalism. 9
Although Lopez and Morrison are undoubtedly federalism cases
first, here I want to discuss a different feature of the cases: the
significance they accord to the elusive distinction between commercial
and non-commercial activity. I begin with Lopez. Although the case
could be understood as turning on the adequacy of congressional
findings, or on how substantial an activity's effects on interstate
commerce must be to justify federal regulation, neither of these
factors makes much sense of the decision. The Lopez Court expressly
denied that such findings would be dispositive, ° and made no attempt
to dispute the obvious point documented at length by Justice Breyer
in dissent-that the presence of guns near schools has a substantial
impact on students' abilities to learn, which in turn has a substantial
effect on their ability, upon entering the workforce, to contribute to
the national economy.61
Despite all of the Sturm und Drang, the Lopez majority's point was
a remarkably simple analytic and formal one: if the activity that
57. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1999); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996). There is an exception for acts passed pursuant to
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but the exception is narrow.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-86 (2000) (applying the "congruence
and proportionality" test first announced in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639-47 (1999) (same).
58. For example, in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989), the Court declined to read "person" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to include
States. See id. at 64. Citing cases involving Eleventh Amendment immunity, federal
preemption, conditional spending, and statutory construction, the Court announced a
general-purpose plain statement rule: "if Congress intends to alter the 'usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make
its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Id, at 65
(citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (Eleventh
Amendment); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)
(Eleventh Amendment); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(preemption); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981)
(conditional spending); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (conditional
spending); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (statutory construction)).
59. See Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on
the Rehnquist Court, 31 Rutgers L.J. 741, 741 (2000) (characterizing contemporary
concerns for state sovereignty as "Anti-Federalism") [hereinafter Dorf, No Federalists
Here]; Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28 Rutgers
L.J. 825, 825-26 (1997) (same).
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
61. Id. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Barry Friedman, Legislative
Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez,
46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 757,771-76 (1996).
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Congress chooses to regulate is not itself commercial, it does not
matter whether, in the aggregate, non-commercial activities of that
sort have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.62  Absent a
jurisdictional nexus in the statute,6  non-commercial activity is beyond
Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.' If there
was any doubt about this point immediately after Lopez, Morrison
resolved it.65 "[A] fair reading of Lopez," Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the Court, "shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of
the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case."' After
quoting no fewer than eight passages from the Lopez majority and
concurring opinions to that effect, the Morrison Court summarized
prior case law stating that, "in those cases where we have sustained
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity's
substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has
been some sort of economic endeavor."'67 In case we missed the point,
the Morrison Court repeated it six paragraphs later," after observing,
"[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity." 69
Well, you ask, what's wrong with insisting on economic activity as a
predicate to regulation? Isn't it perfectly natural that in deciding
whether some activity falls vithin Congress' authority to regulate
interstate commerce, the Court should require at a bare minimum that
the regulated activity actually be commercial (or as the Court puts it,
economic)?7" If one were to criticize any of the recent federalism
decisions, shouldn't one begin with the prohibition on commandeering
and the expansion of state sovereign immunity? These doctrines have
no discernible roots in the Constitution's text, and the latter actually
seems to contradict the negative pregnant of the Eleventh
Amendment. By contrast with these made-up federalism doctrines,
the Court's effort to limit the Commerce Clause to commercial
activity should satisfy even the most punctilious textualist, should it
not?
62. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
64. In summarizing the holding at the very beginning of the opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote: "The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
65. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2000).
66. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551).
67. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60).
68. See id. at 1751 ("[T]hus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature.").
69. Id.
70. See id at 1766 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Obviously, it would not be inconsistent
with the text of the Commerce Clause itself to declare 'noncommercial' primary
activity beyond or presumptively beyond the scope of the commerce power.").
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We can give affirmative answers to the foregoing rhetorical
questions71 yet still puzzle over the Court's recent insistence that the
regulated activity be "economic." For one thing, the Court does not
in fact consistently require that regulated activity be economic. If a
statute contains a "jurisdictional nexus"-a requirement that the
government prove in each particular case that the object of regulation
has "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce 72
the statute will almost certainly be upheld, regardless of whether the
object of regulation is economic activity.73 A dramatic example is the
recent case of United States v. Kammersell, 4 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a conviction for making a
threatening communication in interstate commerce in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 875(c). The defendant had sent a bomb threat to his
girlfriend via an Internet instant message. Even though the sender
and the recipient were both in Utah, the court deemed the
jurisdictional nexus satisfied because the message was first routed to
the America OnLine server in Virginia, and then back to Utah.75 To
be sure, one might think the Tenth Circuit was mistaken in this
judgment, but note that even in completely conventional,
uncontroversial cases, such as the making of a threat via an interstate
telephone call,76 or interstate stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2261A,77 there is no requirement that the regulated conduct itself be
economic activity. Indeed, one could as easily say of a great many
federal criminal statutes containing a jurisdictional nexus what the
Court says in Lopez of the Gun Free School Zones Act: it "is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms."78 In other words, the Lopez/Morrison requirement that
the regulated activity be economic only applies if there is no
71. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, other doctrines are less warranted in
constitutional text and history than the Court's efforts to limit the scope of the
Commerce Clause. See Dorf, No Federalists Here, supra note 59, at 745.
72. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
73. The Court all but says as much in Morrison. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 n.5
(approvingly noting that the courts of appeals have uniformly upheld a different
provision of the Violence Against Women Act, section 40221 (a), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261(a)(1), which does contain a jurisdictional nexus).
74. 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2664 (2000).
75. See id. at 1138.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming a
conviction of "knowingly transmitting in interstate commerce" a threatening
communication); United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1978)
(affirming a conviction for making "threatening interstate telephone call[s]").
77. See, e.g., United States v. Young, No. 98-4742, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32721,
at *4 (4th Cir. Dec. 16, 1999) (affirming a conviction for interstate stalking), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1704 (2000); United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325, 326 (6th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (en banc) (affirming convictions for "interstate domestic violence and
interstate violation of protection orders"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003 (1999).
78. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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jurisdictional nexus to interstate activity of any kind; there is no
requirement that the particular interstate activity be economic. The
decision to give determinative weight to the economic or commercial
character of the regulated activity absent a jurisdictional nexus
cannot, therefore, be understood as an inevitable consequence of
constitutional text.
The real reason for the Court's requirement that the regulated
activity be economic in cases like Lopez and Morrison has little to do
with constitutional text as such. It is instead the Court's fear that
without some such limiting principle, the Commerce Clause would
grant Congress a general police power, thus entirely defeating the
notion that the Constitution creates a government of enumerated
powers.79
That is an understandable worry, but it does not explain why the
Court settles on this limiting principle. If one wants to take the text as
a guide, why not a limiting principle that, as in the jurisdictional nexus
cases, focuses on the interstate character of the regulated activity
rather than its commercial character? In circumscribing the limits of
national power, surely the interstate character of activity is a more apt
criterion than its commercial character. It is, after all, precisely the
point of a national government to address matters that affect multiple
states. Whether the regulated activity at issue is commercial is less
fundamental to the purposes of a federal union than whether it is
interstate.
The problem, of course, is that the Court tried this approach during
Lochner's heyday. While the Court was reading property and
contract rights broadly, it was also reading the Commerce Clause
narrowly. In particular, from the 1890s through the mid-1930s,
"Commerce... among the several States" was understood by the
Court to connote trade or movement as opposed to production." The
Court distinguished between direct and indirect connections to
79. See id at 564 ("Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of the
Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is
unable to identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not.").
Following Herbert Wechsler, Jesse Choper, and now Larry Kramer, one might think
that abandoning the quest for a limiting principle would not defeat the enumerated
powers strategy, but merely commit it to the political safeguards of federalism. See
Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 171-259 (1980);
Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism, in Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 49-82 (1961). However, the
members of the LopezlMorrison majority are unlikely to accept that argument. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,304 (1936) ("Mining brings the subject
matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of it."); United States v. E.C.




interstate commerce, but the distinction proved unworkable given the
realities of an integrated national economy.81
The same may prove true for the economic/non-economic
distinction.82 As Justice Souter wrote in his Lopez dissent, "[t]he
distinction between what is patently commercial and what is not looks
much like the old distinction between what directly affects commerce
and what touches it only indirectly., 83  Literally any activity, if
compensated, is economic, and even absent actual compensation, one
can always impute it. Nor does it take much imagination to see the
difficulties with the Court's line. For example, at the end of the Lopez
majority's parade of horribles comes the specter of a national
curriculum,8' but in the age of the information economy, surely
education is quite closely linked to commerce. If the Constitution
prohibits Congress from prescribing a national curriculum, that must
be because, in the Justices' view, education is a matter of almost
uniquely state and local concern, 5 notwithstanding its patently
commercial character.
Looking for some limiting principle, the Lopez/Morrison Court
understandably gravitated toward the textually plausible distinction
between commercial and non-commercial activity. Justice Souter
stated in his Morrison dissent that the majority deployed the
distinction because it "is useful in serving a conception of
federalism." 6 The distinction is not merely useful, however; it seems
natural. Because a generation of rights cases had accustomed the
Court to thinking the commercial character of an activity was a
legitimate basis for subjecting that activity to regulation of any kind,
the Lopez/Morrison majority was comfortable using the
economic/non-economic distinction to sort those activities that could
be subject to federal regulation from those that were left to the states.
81. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-57.
82. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1774-75 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
83. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 565.
85. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) ("[T]he federal courts in
devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in
managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. In Brown H the Court
squarely held that '[sichool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems ... ' (alteration in original) (citing Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) ("[Tlhis case... involves the most persistent and difficult
questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed
judgments made at the state and local levels.").
86. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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III. THE ROom OF THE COMMERCIALI./NON-COMMERCIAL
DISTINCTION
Why would the Justices and other constitutionalists want to
associate commercial activity with regulability and non-commercial
activity with regulatory immunity? I have argued thus far that
Lochner serves as an anti-paradigmY7 Along with Dred Scott v.
Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson,9 Lochner is taken as the very
antithesis of correct constitutional decision-making.' But why exactly
was Lochner wrongly decided?
On one view, Lochner was wrong because it was activist. This is a
controversial interpretation, however, because, in one category of
cases or another, all of the Justices are activist, in the sense of willing
to overrule democratically chosen outcomes even absent an
exceptionally clear constitutional basis for doing sot Crudely, the
liberals are activists (or at least unwilling to roll back decisions of
Warren Court activists) in cases involving rights claims by
individuals,' whereas the conservatives are activists in cases involving
limits on federal power for the benefit of the States.93 No doubt each
side believes that it can distinguish between good and bad judicial
activism,94 but this merely highlights the fact that no one takes the
overruling of Lochner to stand for a repudiation of judicial activism in
87. See supra Part I.
88. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
89. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), may soon be added to this infamous list.
91. There are numerous definitions of judicial activism. See, e.g., Bradley C.
Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in Supreme Court
Activism and Restraint 385 (Steven C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982). 1 am
using the term here to mean any view of judicial review that leads to substantially
more frequent counter-majoritarian decision-making than one would expect under an
approach like the one described in James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
92. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597,2604-20 (2000); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 623-36 (1996). I emphasize that this is a crude categorization. Neither
Justice O'Connor, who joins the majority in both of these cases, nor Justice Kennedy,
the author of Romer, is a liberal, and the four relatively liberal Justices are all to the
right of the late Justices Brennan and Marshall.
93. See, eg., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
Note, especially, Justice Souter's howls of protest and invocation of Lochner in Alden,
527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The resemblance of today's state sovereign
immunity to the Lochner era's industrial due process is striking. The Court began this
century by imputing immutable constitutional status to a conception of economic self-
reliance that was never true to industrial life and grew insistently fictional with the
years, and the Court has chosen to close the century by conferring like status on a
conception of state sovereign immunity that is true neither to history nor to the
structure of the Constitution."), and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 166 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority today, indeed, seems to be going Lochner one better.").
94. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,889-96 (4th
Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), affd sub nora., United States v. Morrison,
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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all forms. There is consensus, however, that, whatever other
significance may be attributed to the overruling of Lochner, at a
minimum it disestablishes laissez-faire as a constitutional principle. It
is this association of Lochner with laissez-faire, I have argued thus far,
that tempts the Justices to associate commercial activity with
regulability and non-commercial activity with regulatory immunity.
There may also be older connections between these domains. To
oversimplify enormously, American history can be understood as a
grand struggle between Alexander Hamilton's and Thomas
Jefferson's conceptions of the good society and the role of
government in promoting it. Hamilton envisioned a commercial
empire in which an activist federal government would foster economic
activity while eliminating regional, state, and local barriers to
commerce.95  On one account, Jefferson disdained large-scale
commerce and its effects on character; he envisioned a nation of self-
sufficient yeoman farmers participating in public life to deliberate
about the common good, but he was generally skeptical of all
exercises of government power. 6
95. Statements to this effect abound in Hamilton's public papers. See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton); The Federalist No. 36, at 223 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("I acknowledge my aversion to every project
that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible
contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.");
Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist, No. 5. N.Y. Packet (Apr. 18, 1782), reprinted
in Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation 358 (Richard B. Morris ed.,
1957) [hereinafter Founding] ("Commerce, like other things, has its fixed principles,
according to which it must be regulated. If these are understood and observed, it will
be promoted by the attention of government; if unknown, or violated, it will be
injured-but it is the same with every other part of administration."); Alexander
Hamilton, Original Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in
Founding, supra, at 361 ("[Agriculture's] real interests ... will be advanced, rather
than injured, by the due encouragement of manufactures .... [T]he expediency of
such encouragement, in a general view, may be shown to be recommended by the
most cogent and persuasive motives of national policy. ... "); see also Lance Banning,
The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic
29-39, 208-14, 309-16 (1995) (discussing Hamilton's views during the Founding
period); Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life 38-51, 265-88 (Archon Books
1963) (1909) (recognizing the Hamiltonian school at the founding and tracing its
developments throughout the "second republic"); James Landis, The Administrative
Process (7th prtg. 1966) (providing the standard view of Hamilton's nationalism
during the first half of the twentieth century); Richard B. Morris, Alexander Hamilton
After Two Centuries, in Founding, supra, at ix ("Hamilton was the friend of business
enterprise, but he believed that business should be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, that competition should be fostered and monopoly discouraged. He
did not subscribe to the view that business was not the business of government.");
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment 529-30 (1975) ("Hamilton saw America as
predestined to become a commercial and military empire .... The whole argument is
based on the ascendancy of commerce over frugality.") (citing Gerald Stourzh,
Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government, chs. IV & V (1970)).
96. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia: Query XIX:
Manufactures (1782), reprinted in Thomas Jefferson: Selected Writings 52 (Harvey C.
Mansfield, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter Mansfield] ("Those who labour in the earth are
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Still oversimplifying, we might follow those historians who claim
that Jacksonians inherited the Jeffersonian tradition and passed it on
to Populists, who in turn were succeeded by Progressives, finally
paving the way for the New Deal.9 True, along the path from
Jefferson to (both) Roosevelt(s) there were substantial ideological
reversals-most significantly in attitudes towards activist government.
Nonetheless, there is continuity also. Fear of concentrated economic
power-and a concomitant preference for self-reliance over
dependence on the market-are recurrent leitmotifs in this tradition.93
Do the current Justices endorse the foregoing narrative? Maybe,
maybe not, but by viewing the Court's attitudes towards commerce as
neo-Jeffersonian we can closely connect those attitudes to the
resurgent interest in state sovereignty. In important respects, the
current debate over the scope of the Commerce Clause replays the
Founding Era debate between Jefferson and Hamilton. To be sure,
with the possible exception of Justice Thomas," none of the current
Justices takes as restrictive a view of commerce as Jefferson did," but
the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made
his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue."); Thomas Jefferson, First
Inaugural Address (1801), reprinted in Mansfield, supra, at 65 ("[Wlhat ... is
necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? ... [A] wise and frugal
government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave
them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and
shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of
good government .... "); see also Kenneth Dolbeare, American Political Thought 159
(4th ed. 1998) ("Jefferson... feared that an urban mass of impoverished and unstable
workers would be created should Hamilton's goal of establishing manufacturing
succeed. And he adamantly opposed the expansion of national powers at the cost of
state and local responsibilities."); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform 23 (1955)
("Writers like Thomas Jefferson ... admired the yeoman farmer not for his capacity
to exploit opportunities and make money but for his honest industry, his
independence, his frank spirit of equality, his ability to produce and enjoy a simple
abundance.").
97. See Merrill D. Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind 69-87
(1962) (Jacksonians); id. at 257-65 (Populists); id. at 328-34 (Progressives); id. at 355-
76 (New Deal); see also Pocock, supra note 95, at 532-52 (tracing the agrarian -myth"
through early American rhetoric). For a skeptical (practically mocking) account of
these Jeffersonian traces, see Joyce Appleby, Without Resolution: The Jeffersonian
Tensions in American Nationalism 2 (1992) (citing Clinton Rossiter, Which Thomas
Jefferson Do You Quote?, Reporter 17 (1955)).
98. Consider a recent example of this way of viewing the world. Commenting on
the goals of antitrust law, my colleague Harvey Goldschmid expressly associates
Jeffersonianism and Progressivism with hostility to the concentration of economic
power. See Stephen Labaton, The Nation: 800 Pound Gorillas: Oligopoly, N.Y. Times,
June 11, 2000, § 4, at 1 ("We can't go back to a Jeffersonian world or a literal
Brandeis concern about human-sized institutions....").
99. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (reiterating the need for an "original understanding" of the commerce
power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(urging a highly restrictive interpretation of the Federal Government's power under
the Commerce Clause).
100. See, eg., Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on rite Constitutionality of a National
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the conservative Justices do, in their efforts to protect state
sovereignty, stake a (perhaps unwitting) claim to the Jeffersonian
legacy.
In this view, states are seen as virtuous republics, whose relatively
small size allows for truer participatory democracy than is possible in
the extended Republic. Politics, in the civic republican tradition, is a
domain of reasons, not interests, and thus protection even against the
states themselves is afforded to those entities that are free of the taint
of the market. Accordingly, even as it protects the states from the
federal government, the 5-4 Anti-Federalist majority of the current
Supreme Court (as I have dubbed them elsewhere), 01 stands ready to
protect from state regulation those most central participatory
institutions-associations like the Boy Scouts and political parties. 10,
Yet there are two sorts of reasons why neo-Jeffersonianism as I
have just described it would provide a very weak justification for the
Court's newfound reliance on the distinction between economic and
non-economic activity: first, it is not true to Jefferson; second, and
more important, it is not suited to modern conditions.
Begin with Jefferson, and let us put to one side the most glaring
contradiction in the Jeffersonian vision itself, its entanglement with
slavery,103 which required a peculiar conception of self-sufficiency. As
Joyce Appleby's work demonstrates so well, Jefferson and his fellow
Republicans would have rejected the basic assumptions of post-1937
constitutionalism; they wanted to limit federal regulatory competence
precisely because they were, to an even greater degree than Hamilton
and the Federalists, economic libertarians.10 The tendency to treat
the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal as anti-market is largely a
Populist/Progressive legacy.0  Thus, it stands Jeffersonianism on its
Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 416-21 (Merrill D.
Peterson ed., 1984); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation 433-
34 (1970).
101. See Dorf, No Federalists Here, supra note 59, at 741.
102. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2414 (2000) (invalidating
California's blanket primary as a violation of political parties' right of expressive
association). Jones was decided by the same 5-4 majority as Boy Scouts and the
federalism cases. The Anti-Federalist majority fractured in one important case in the
1999-2000 Term, but that is hardly surprising given that the case involved a claim of
constitutional right to use money for political gain. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). More generally, whenever an organization employs
market-based means to pursue public ends, a wedge is driven between the non-
economic/economic distinction and the public/private distinction.
103. See John Chester Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery
(1977); see also Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson
129-40 (1991).
104. See Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican
Vision of the 1790s, at 88 (1984) ("Alexander Hamilton labeled the idea that
commerce might regulate itself a 'wild speculative paradox,' but Adam Smith's
invisible hand was warmly clasped by Republicans.")
105. See id. at 45-46.
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head to protect a sphere of state sovereignty over non-economic
activity when, in Jeffersonian terms, the greatest threat to liberty
comes from federal intervention in the economy.
Appleby's reading of Jefferson is, admittedly, controversial among
historians."6 Suppose, then, that following J.G.A. Pocock, we do
understand Jefferson as a New World civic republican in the tradition
of Bolingbroke, committed to an agrarian republic because self-
reliance would breed the sort of virtue necessary for participation in
public life.107 But if that is the meaning of Jeffersonianism, it has
almost no bearing on contemporary American society. In 1800, 74
percent of American laborers were farmers." Today, agriculture
accounts for only 2.8 percent of American economic activity,"'
employing a mere 2.6 percent of American workers."" Of that 2.6
percent, only approximately one third own the land they work."'
Meanwhile, the United States has become the center of the world
economy. With 4.5 percent of the world's population, 2 the United
106. See Gordon S. Wood, Early American Get-Up-and-Go, N.Y. Rev. Books, June
29, 2000, at 50, 51 (describing Joyce Appleby's dispute with adherents of the
"republican synthesis" in Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of
Americans (2000)); Peter S. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional
Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 Win. & Mary Q. 341, 350-51 (1989):
Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the
New American Republic, 43 Win. & Mary Q. 3, 14 (1986).
107. See Pocock, supra note 95, at 533 ("[Jefferson was] as committed as any
classical republican to the ideal of virtue, but saw the preconditions of virtue as
agrarian rather than natural."); id. at 538-39 ("Let us resume exegesis of the text cited
from Jefferson's Notes on Virginia [see supra note 96]. Commerce -the progress of
the arts-corrupts the virtue of agrarian man; but, Webster had added and Jefferson
had agreed, an agrarian society can absorb commerce, and an expanding agrarian
society can absorb an expanding commerce. America is the world's garden; there is
an all but infinite reservoir of free land, and expansion to fill it is the all but infinite
expansion of virtue.")
108. Out of a total labor force of 1.9 million men, 1.4 million were engaged in
Agriculture. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1 Historical Statistics of
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, at 139 (1975).
109. In 1997, Gross Farm Product for the United States was S225,300,000,000.
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 679 (119th ed., 1999) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract, 119th ed.]. United States
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") was $7,824,600,000,000. Id. at 842. This
information is also available on the internet at http://wwv.oecd.orglstd/gdp.htm.
110. In 1998, out of 131,463,000 employed Americans, 3,358,000 worked in
agriculture. Statistical Abstract, 119th ed., supra note 109, at 424-26.
111. Out of 3,399,000 employed in agriculture in 1997,1,147,000 were full owners of
the land they worked. Id. at 675; Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 410 (118th ed., 1998).
112. As of this writing, the United States Census Bureau estimates the 2000 world
population to be 6,085,247,300 and the United States population to be 275,321,055.
Statistical Abstract, 119th ed., supra note 109, at 831, 834. These statistics are
available on the internet at http'vlwww.census.govlmainlwwwlpopclock.html and
http://www.census.gov/ipc/wvvwwvorldpop.html.
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States accounts for 36.8 percent of its economic output"3 and nearly
25 percent of its consumption.
14
American culture more broadly also appears to have taken a
decidedly commercial turn. Especially since the collapse of
communism and the triumph of global capitalism, commercial
conceptions of value have penetrated ever more deeply into our
national ethos. Professions that once saw themselves as removed
from, if not wholly immune to market forces-such as journalism,"'5
medicine, 116 and law' 7-have become increasingly focused on the
113. The United States GDP in 1998 was $7,824,000,000,000. Total GDP for all the
world's countries was $21,246,000,000,000. Statistical Abstract, 119th ed., supra note
109, at 842; see also http://www.oecd.org/std/gdp.htm.
114. For example, the United States' primary energy consumption in 1997 was 94.2
quadrillion Btu, compared to total world consumption of 379.5 quadrillion. See
Statistical Abstract, 119th ed., supra note 109, at 853.
115. Compare Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly 203 (1st ed., 1983)
("Newspapers no longer depend solely on their readers. They must satisfy
advertisers, Wall Street investors, and parent corporations.... In the race for short-
term profits, the American newspaper is no different from other large American
corporations in the last half of the twentieth century."), with Herbert J. Gans,
Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News,
Newsweek, and Time 214 (1979) ("Since national news is produced commercially, one
might imagine that story selectors are under constant pressure to choose news which
will attract the most profitable audience. In practice, however, they are not ....
[E]ditorial and business departments operate independently of each other."). See also
Max Frankel, The Wall, Vindicated, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 24
(discussing need to separate business and editorial functions); Max Frankel, What's
Happened to the Media?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 (same);
Iver Peterson, The Bottom-Line Publisher of the Los Angeles Times Faces the Hard-
Line Skeptics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1998, at D7 (same).
116. See Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A
Dose of Realism, 128 Annals Internal Med. 395, 395 (1998) ("Medical ethics and
medical economics are increasingly in conflict."); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Medicine,
Money, and Morals: Physicians' Conflicts of Interest 11-13 (1993); Jerome P. Kassirer,
Managed Care and the Morality of the Marketplace, 333 New Eng. J. Med. 50, 50
(1995) ("Market-driven health care creates conflicts that threaten our
professionalism. On the one hand, doctors are expected to provide a wide range of
services, recommend the best treatments, and improve patients' quality of life. On the
other, to keep expenses to a minimum they must limit the use of services, increase
efficiency, shorten the time spent with each patient, and use specialists sparingly.
Although many see this as an abstract dilemma, I believe that increasingly the
struggle will be more concrete and stark: physicians will be forced to choose between
the best interests of their patients and their own economic survival.").
117. Consider, for example, the developing interest in "Multi-Disciplinary
Partnerships," in which lawyers and non-lawyers work together to provide full-service
legal and extra-legal counseling to large clients (and, not accidentally, to greatly
increase hourly rates). See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-first Century, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 83 (2000); Richard E. Mikels & Mark I. Davies, Multidisciplinary Practices:
Ethical Concerns or Economic Concerns, Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (July 1999), 1999 ABJ
JNL LEXIS 103; Ronald A. Landen, Comment, The Prospects of the Accountant-
Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partnership in English-Speaking Countries, 13 Emory Int'l
L. Rev. 763 (1999); Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop
Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should be Permitted in the
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bottom line; shopping, whether over the internet or at stores that
never close, has become a national pastime;" 8 and many of the most
ambitious public policy proposals now urge the transfer of functions
from government to private actors.'19
Perhaps, as historian Alan Brinkley argues, the policy consensus
that emerged from the late New Deal assured the triumph of market
values. In this consensus, the central role of the federal government
was to promote prosperity, understood by the 1940s as consumer
welfare.20 If Brinkley is right, then the one piece of the New Deal
program that may have fit within the Jeffersonian legacy-hostility to
concentrated economic power-was the piece most clearly jettisoned.
Whatever the precise chronology, 2 there can be little doubt that the
United States today is far removed from the land Jefferson may have
envisioned." Thus, under current circumstances, Jeffersonianism
cannot justify a jurisprudence that divides human endeavors into
spheres of commercial and non-commercial activity.
Indeed, in Commerce Clause cases, the non-commercial sphere will
not even include the few remaining yeoman farmers. Although the
Lopez Court described Wickard v. Filburn2 3 as "perhaps the most far
United States, 21 Fordham Int'l L.J. 190,216-26 (1997).
118. According to the International Council of Shopping Centers, 190 million
adults-or, 94% of the over-18 population-shop at shopping centers in a typical
month. Int'l Council of Shopping Centers, Scope USA (2000),
http://icsc.org/srch/rsrch/scope/currentindex.html. Median total weekly hours of
operation for American shopping malls topped 73 in 1999, an increase of almost 58%
since the 1960s. See Int'l Council of Shopping Centers, The Score: ICSC's Handbook
on Shopping Center Operations, Revenues & Expenses 29-30, 120 (1999); see also
Howard Buerkle, MIE Message, VRN: The Outlet and Off-Price Journals 48 (1999).
In general, the last decade has witnessed an explosion of 24-hour shopping meccas.
See, e.g., Tom Moran, More Places to Shop Round the Clock, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Oct. 17, 1997, at 4.
119. Consider, for example, calls for government-sponsored private school
vouchers, investment of social security accounts in the stock market, and the
privatization of prisons. See, e.g., E. S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better
Government 143-44, 212-18 (1987); Ronald Brownstein, The Role of Government
Comes into Play in Debate over Social Security, L.A. Times, June 26, 2000, at A5. See
generally Charles H. Logan, Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (1990) (providing a
critical examination of arguments against the privatization of prisons).
120. See Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform 170-74 (1995).
121. In the realm of antitrust law, for example, the reorientation away from trust-
busting for its own sake and towards economic efficiency did not take hold until the
Reagan administration. See generally, 10 Business and Government in America Since
1870: Evolution of Antitrust Policy From Johnson to Bush (Robert F. Himmelberg
ed., 1994); Rudolph R. Peritz, Competition Policy in America: 1888-1992: History,
Rhetoric, Law 265-82 (1996).
122. In a colossal miscalculation, Jefferson declared in his first inaugural address
that the United States contained "room enough for our descendants to the hundredth
and thousandth generation." Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, supra note 96, at 64.
Jefferson made this claim prior to the Louisiana Purchase, when the country was
bounded in the West by the Mississippi River and in the south by the northern border
of Florida.
123. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity,"' 24 the Court nonetheless reaffirmed Wickard on the ground
that growing wheat, even for home consumption, is economic
activity."2 And were the Court to take the unlikely step of overruling
Wickard, immunity from federal regulation would still result only for a
tiny class of subsistence farmers. The vast majority of family farmers,
to say nothing of the overwhelming remainder of citizens, would be
subject to federal regulatory authority because they are engaged in
clearly economic activity. Hence, even as the economic/non-economic
distinction of Lopez and Morrison threatens federal regulatory
competence in areas of clear national importance-such as
environmental protection126-it simultaneously permits extensive
federal regulation of the very domain a neo-Jeffersonian would wish
to protect the most.
Nor does the economic/non-economic distinction do a good job of
capturing Jeffersonian ideals in rights cases. In cases like Carter and
Boy Scouts, the economic/non-economic distinction appears to be a
rough proxy for a public/private distinction. But it is a very poor
proxy, as we saw in Part 1.127 That pattern is likely to hold when the
next generation of rights claims arises. For example, modern
computer databases create numerous opportunities for collection of
personal data as a result of increasingly unavoidable, but
unmistakably economic, activities such as credit card purchases or the
use of highway and subway debit cards. These activities in turn create
opportunities for the government to learn about and regulate matters
that many of us would deem private. Categorizing the information
obtained from such transactions as "public" because the transactions
are commercial or economic begs the normative question of whether
to recognize a privacy claim. Just as the economic/non-economic
distinction in Commerce Clause cases leaves nearly everyone but the
hermit subject to federal regulation, so in rights cases, only complete
124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
125. See id. ("Wickard... involved economic activity in a way that the possession
of a gun in a school zone does not. Roscoe Filburn operated a small farm in Ohio, on
which, in the year involved, he raised 23 acres of wheat. It was his practice to sow
winter wheat in the fall, and after harvesting it in July to sell a portion of the crop, to
feed part of it to poultry and livestock on the farm, to use some in making flour for
home consumption, and to keep the remainder for seeding future crops.").
126. In Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S.
Ct. 675 (2001), the Court rejected an interpretation of section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, that would have empowered the Army Corps of Engineers to
block development on wetlands used by migratory birds. The Court narrowly
construed the statute because it believed the respondent's interpretation raised
"significant constitutional questions." Id. at 683.
127. I am claiming only that the economic/non-economic distinction does not
closely track the values that lead the Court to draw a public/private distinction. I am
not making the further claim that the public/private distinction is pernicious. For an
application of that claim to the issue in Morrison, see Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence
Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 Ohio State L.J. 1 (2000).
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withdrawal from public life could preserve a rights claim if the
distinction were consistently applied.
Furthermore, as the Boy Scouts case reveals, the non-commercial
category is not only too narrow; it is also too broad. For, even if the
Boy Scouts are in some sense a non-commercial organization, they are
very much a public one, and it is this dimension of the organization
that the Court's decision most clearly overlooks. De Tocqueville
famously observed that civil society organizations- whether or not
engaged in what might be called commercial affairs -play an essential
role in nurturing democracy in America.' "- That observation applies
doubly to the Boy Scouts, an organization devoted to creating good
citizens. As I noted above, the Boy Scouts Court was right to resist
(even if only partly) Justice O'Connor's inclination to make the case
turn exclusively on the fact that the Boy Scouts were not engaged in
commercial affairs in the way that the Jaycees and the Rotary were."z
But in partially avoiding one formalism, the Court fell into another:
an unwarranted reliance on the public/private distinction. Deciding
whether to recognize a claim of regulatory immunity is an
unavoidably normative question that sharp distinctions like
commercial/non-commercial or even public/private often do not
capture very well.
This last point applies to doctrinal categories more generally.
Consider the Boy Scouts case one final time. During the oral
argument, some of the Justices expressed concern that a victory for
Dale would mean that states could require the Boy Scouts to admit
girls as troop members and women as leaders.'" That is hardly clear,
however. Granting the Boy Scouts associationhl autonomy may be
appropriate in the face of a claim by a girl because there exist
alternative co-educational and all-girls organizations that provide
roughly the same opportunities as the Boy Scouts. For children, at
least, separate-but-equal on grounds of sex does not seem nearly as
128. See Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 403-08 (Thomas Bender
ed., Modem Library 1981) (1835) ("Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our
attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America.... In democratic
countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the
rest depends upon the progress it has made.... Americans of all ages, all conditions,
and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other
kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or
diminutive.... Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the
government in France or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be
sure to find an association."). The contemporary version credits associations with
building social capital. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and
Revival of American Community 19-26 (2000).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
130. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 44, at
*24-25 (Apr. 26, 2000).
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invidious as separate-but-equal on grounds of race."' Now a rigid
doctrinalist might think that if the Boy Scouts' autonomy claim can
override a prohibition on sex discrimination, a fortiori it can override
a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination: the former is,
constitutionally speaking, more invidious. Yet this sort of decision by
doctrinal categorization is unsatisfying in just the way that the
deployment of the economic/non-economic distinction is. The social
meaning of the Boy Scouts' exclusion of girls and women is separate
but equal. The social meaning of their exclusion of gay troop leaders
and members is the subordination of gays.
Perhaps a persuasive argument could nonetheless be made that the
Boy Scouts ought to have the constitutional right to exclude gays. But
if so, it would have to take account of the fact that the Boy Scouts are
unlike the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder132 or the subsistence farmers I
hypothesized in the discussion of Wickard.133 The Boy Scouts are not
some small quaint group whose right to exclude those whom the
organization disapproves contributes only marginally to our public
life."3 Through their practices, the Boy Scouts, along with many other
associations, constitute our public life. Any discussion of regulatory
immunity should begin with that fact.
CONCLUSION
The themes I have identified here transcend ideology. The
moderate/liberal Justices of the Rehnquist Court are less concerned
about preserving property rights and more interested in distinguishing
cases like Roe v. Wade1 35 from Lochner than are the conservatives;
hence the moderates/liberals are, if anything, more likely to find the
commercial/non-commercial distinction useful than the conservatives
are. Because the conservatives are currently in the majority, I have
concentrated in this article on conservative decisions employing the
commercial/non-commercial distinction to privilege the latter, but, as
the discussion in Part II makes clear, that move is a standard one in
constitutional law, available to conservatives and liberals alike.
So too, despite the large-scale changes in our economic and social
life, is Jeffersonianism available to all ideological persuasions. This is
a mixed blessing to be sure, for some of the contemporary
Jeffersonian echoes are truly horrifying. For example, when he was
131. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,532-33 (1996).
132. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
133. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
134. It is not even clear that the Amish are such a group. See generally Donald B.
Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture (1989); Donald B. Kraybill & Steven M. Nolt,
Amish Enterprise: From Plows to Profits (1995); Jack Brubaker, Each Weekend,
Hundreds of Amish Sell Farm Goods Outside the County, Lancaster New Era, Mar. 3,
2000, at A10.
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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arrested, Timothy McVeigh wore a tee-shirt emblazoned with
Jefferson's statement that "[t]he tree of liberty must be refreshed
from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants."'1 However,
the Jeffersonian legacy cannot simply be dismissed as part wistful
symbol, part paranoia. 37 For its core ideals-such as respect for
individual rights of conscience and distrust of government-remain
very much mainstream American ideals, and constitutional ones at
that. Any worthwhile constitutional vision must honor them. But
however else the Court chooses to pay homage to Jefferson and our
other constitutional heroes,'3 it should not rely on rigid categories
that bear little relation to the circumstances of modern life.
136. Jo Thomas, Trial Begins in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 1997, at Al.
137. See generally Garry Wills, A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust
of Government (1999).
138. Constitutional law is full of what I have elsewhere described as "heroic
originalism," the selective invocation of bits and pieces of Revolutionary Era thought
to buttress one or another argument. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo. LJ. 1765,
1803-05 (1997). There is a legitimate place for heroic originalism, for believing "that
the Founders of the Republic had insight into the problems of government which
their handiwork addressed." Id. at 1801. When performed clumsily, however, this
enterprise is the worst form of law office history.
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